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Abstract
Distributed implementations of access control abound in distributed storage proto-
cols. While such implementations are often accompanied by informal justifications
of their correctness, our formal analysis reveals that their correctness can be tricky.
In particular, we discover several subtleties in a state-of-the-art implementation
based on capabilities, that can undermine correctness under a simple specification
of access control.
We consider both safety and security for correctness; loosely, safety requires
that an implementation does not introduce unspecified behaviors, and security re-
quires that an implementation preserves the specified behavioral equivalences. We
show that a secure implementation of a static access policy already requires some
care in order to prevent unspecified leaks of information about the access policy.
A dynamic access policy causes further problems. For instance, if accesses can be
dynamically granted then the implementation does not remain secure—it leaks in-
formation about the access policy. If accesses can be dynamically revoked then the
implementation does not even remain safe. We show that a safe implementation is
possible if a clock is introduced in the implementation. A secure implementation
is possible if the specification is accordingly generalized.
Our analysis shows how a distributed implementation can be systematically de-
signed from a specification, guided by precise formal goals. While our results are
based on formal criteria, we show how violations of each of those criteria can lead
to real attacks. We distill the key ideas behind those attacks and propose correc-
tions in terms of useful design principles. We show that other stateful computations
can be distributed just as well using those principles.
1 Introduction
In most file systems, protection relies on access control. Usually the access checks are
local—the file system maintains an access policy that specifies which principals may
access which files, and any access to a file is guarded by a local check that enforces the
policy for that file. In recent file systems, however, the access checks are distributed,
and access control is implemented via cryptographic techniques. In this paper, we try
to understand the extent to which these distributed implementations of access control
preserve the simple character of local access checks.
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We focus on implementations that appear in file systems based on networked stor-
age [13]. In such systems, access control and storage are parallelized to improve per-
formance. Execution requests are served by storage servers; such requests are guided
by access requests that are served elsewhere by access-control servers. When a user
requests access to a file, an access-control server certifies the access decision for that
file by providing the user with an unforgeable capability. Any subsequent execution
request carries that capability as proof of access; a storage server can efficiently verify
that the capability is authentic and serve the execution request.
We formally study the correctness of these implementations vis-a`-vis a simple spec-
ification of local access control. Implementing static access policies already requires
some care in this setting; dynamic access policies cause further problems that require
considerable analysis. We study these cases separately in Sections 2 and 3. Based on
our analysis, we develop formal models and proofs for an implementation of arbitrary
access policies in Section 6.
We consider both safety and security for correctness; loosely, safety requires that an
implementation does not introduce unspecified behaviors, and security requires that an
implementation preserves the specified behavioral equivalences. Our proofs of safety
and security are built modularly by showing simulations; we develop the necessary
definitions and proof techniques in Section 4.
Our analysis shows how a distributed implementation can be systematically de-
signed from a specification, guided by precise formal goals. We justify those goals by
showing how their violations can lead to real attacks (Sections 2 and 3). Further, we
distill the key ideas behind those attacks and propose corrections in terms of useful
design principles. We show that other stateful computations can be distributed just as
well using those principles (Section 7).
Comparison with related work This paper culminates a line of work that we begin
in [10] and continue in [11]. In [10], we show how to securely implement static access
policies with capabilities; in [11], we present a safe (but not secure) implementation of
dynamic access policies in that setting. In this paper, we carefully review those results,
and systematically analyze the difficulties that arise for security in the case of dynamic
access policies. Our analysis leads us to develop variants of the implementation in [11]
that we can prove secure with appropriate assumptions. The proofs are built by a new,
instructive technique, which may be of independent interest.
Further, guided by our analysis of access control, we show how to automatically de-
rive secure distributed implementations of other stateful computations. This approach
is reminiscent of secure program partitioning [22].
Access control for networked storage has been studied in lesser detail by Gob-
ioff [13] using belief logics, and by Halevi et al. [15] using universal composability [9].
The techniques used in this paper are similar to those used by Abadi et al. for secure
implementation of channel abstractions [2] and authentication primitives [3], and by
Maffeis to study the equivalence of communication patterns in distributed query sys-
tems [17]. These techniques rely on programming languages concepts, including test-
ing equivalence [21] and full abstraction [19, 1]. A huge body of such techniques have
been developed for formal specification and verification of systems.
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We do not consider access control for untrusted storage [16] in this paper. In file
systems based on untrusted storage, files are cryptographically secured before storage,
and their access keys are managed and shared by users. As such, untrusted storage is
quite similar to public communication, and standard techniques for secure communi-
cation on public networks apply for secure storage in this setting. Related work in that
area includes formal analysis of protocols for secure file sharing on untrusted storage
[18, 8], as well as correctness proofs for the cryptographic techniques involved in such
protocols [7, 12, 6].
2 Review: the case of static access policies
To warm up, let us focus on implementing access policies that are static. In this case,
a secure implementation already appears in [10]. Below we systematically reconstruct
that implementation, focusing on a detailed analysis of its correctness. This analysis
allows us to distill some basic design principles, marked with bold R, in preparation for
later sections, where we consider the more difficult problem of implementing dynamic
access policies.
Consider the following protocol, NSs, for networked storage.1 Principals include
users U, V,W . . ., an access-control server A, and a storage server S. We assume that
A maintains a (static) access policy F and S maintains a store ρ. Access decisions
under F follow the relation F ⊢U op over users U and operations op. Execution of an
operation op under ρ follows the relation ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK over next stores ρ′ and results
r. Let KAS be a secret key shared by A and S, and mac be a function over messages
and keys that produces unforgeable message authentication codes (MACs) [14]. We
assume that MACs can be decoded to retrieve their messages. (Usually MACs are
explicitly paired with their messages, so that the decoding is trivial.)
(1) U → A : op
(2) A → U : mac(op,KAS) if F ⊢U op
(2′) A → U : error otherwise
(3) V → S : κ
(4) S → V : r if κ = mac(op,KAS)
and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
(4′) S → V : error otherwise
Here a user U requests A for access to an operation op, and A returns a capability
for op only if F specifies that U may access op. Elsewhere, a user V requests S to
execute an operation by sending a capability κ, and S executes the operation only if κ
authorizes access to that operation.
What does “safety” or “security” mean in this setting? A reasonable specification
of correctness is the following trivial protocol, IS s, for ideal storage. Here principals
include users U, V,W, . . . and a server D. The access policy F and the store ρ are
1By convention, we use superscripts s and d to denote “static” and “dynamic”, and superscripts + and −
to denote “extension” and “restriction”.
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both maintained by D; the access and execution relations remain as above. There is no
cryptography.
(i) V → D : op
(ii) D → V : r if F ⊢V op and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
(ii′) D → V : error otherwise
Here a user V requests D to execute an operation op, and V executes op only if F
specifies that V may access op. This trivial protocol is correct “by definition”; so if
NSs implements this protocol, it is correct as well.
What notions of implementation correctness are appropriate here? A basic criterion
is that of safety [4].
Definition 1 (Safety). Under any context (adversary), the behaviors of a safe imple-
mentation are included in the behaviors of the specification.
In practice, a suitable notion of inclusion may need to be crafted to accommodate
specific implementation behaviors by design (such as those due to messages (1), (2),
and (2′) in NS s). Typically, those behaviors can be eliminated by a specific context
(called a “wrapper”), and safety may be defined modulo that context as long as other,
interesting behaviors are not eliminated.
Still, safety only implies the preservation of certain trace properties. A more pow-
erful criterion may be derived from the programming languages concept of semantics
preservation, otherwise known as full abstraction [19, 1].
Definition 2 (Security). A secure implementation preserves behavioral equivalences
of the specification.
In this paper, we tie security to an appropriate may testing congruence [21]. We con-
sider a protocol instance to include the file system and some code run by “honest”
users, and assume that an arbitrary context colludes with the remaining “dishonest”
users. From any NSs instance, we derive its ISs instance by an appropriate refinement
map [4]. If NSs securely implements ISs, then for all NSs instances Q1 and Q2, Q1
and Q2 are congruent if their IS s instances are congruent.
Security implies safety for all practical purposes, so a safety counterexample usu-
ally suffices to break security. For instance, we are in trouble if operations that cannot
be executed in IS s can somehow be executed in NSs by manipulating capabilities.
Suppose that F 6⊢V op for all dishonest V . Then no such V can execute op in IS s.
Now suppose that some such V requests execution of op in NSs. We know that op is
executed only if V shows a capability κ for op. Since κ cannot be forged, it must be
obtained from A by some honest U that satisfies F ⊢U op. Therefore:
R1 Capabilities obtained by honest users must not be shared with dishonest users.
(However U can still share κ with honest users, and any execution request with κ can
then be reproduced in the specification as an execution request by U .)
While (R1) prevents explicit leaking of capabilities, we in fact require that capabil-
ities do not leak any information that is not available to ISs contexts. Information may
also be leaked implicitly (by observable effects). Therefore:
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R2 Capabilities obtained by honest users must not be examined or compared.
Both (R1) and (R2) may be enforced by typechecking the code run by honest users.
Finally, we require that information is not leaked via capabilities obtained by dis-
honest users. (Recall that such capabilities are already available to the adversary.) Un-
fortunately, a capability for an operation op is provided only to those users who have
access to op under F ; in other words, A leaks information on F whenever it returns
a capability! This leak breaks security. Why? Consider implementation instances Q1
and Q2 with op as the only operation, whose execution returns error and may be ob-
served only by honest users; suppose that a dishonest user has access to op in Q1 but
not in Q2. Then Q1 and Q2 can be distinguished by a context that requests a capabil-
ity for op—a capability will be returned in Q1 but not in Q2—but their specification
instances cannot be distinguished by any context.
Why does this leak concern us? After all, we expect that executing an operation
should eventually leak some information about access to that operation, since other-
wise, having access to that operation is useless! However the leak here is premature; it
allows a dishonest user to obtain information about its access to op in an undetectable
way, without having to request execution of op.
To prevent this leak, we must modify the protocol:
R3 “Fake” capabilities for op must be returned to users who do not have access to op.
The point is that it should not be possible to distinguish the fake capabilities from
the real ones prematurely. Let KAS be another secret key shared by A and S. As a
preliminary fix, let us modify the following message in NSs.
(2′) A → U : mac(op,KAS) if F 6⊢U op
Unfortunately this modification is not enough, since the adversary can still compare
capabilities that are obtained by different users for a particular operation op, to know
if their accesses to op are the same under F . To prevent this leak:
R4 Capabilities for different users must be different.
For instance, a capability can mention the user whose access it authenticates. Making
the meaning of a message explicit in its content is a good design principle for security
[5], and we use it on several occasions in this paper. Accordingly we modify the
following messages in NSs.
(2) A → U : mac(〈U, op〉,KAS) if F ⊢U op
(2′) A → U : mac(〈U, op〉,KAS) otherwise
(4) S → V : r if κ = mac(〈 , op〉,KAS)
and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
(On receiving a capability κ from V , S still does not care whether V is the user to
which κ is issued, even if that information can now be obtained from κ.)
The following result can then be proved (cf. [10]).
Theorem 1. NSs securely implements IS s.
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3 The case of dynamic access policies
We now consider the more difficult problem of implementing dynamic access policies.
Let F be dynamic; the following protocol, NSd, is obtained by adding administration
messages to NS s. Execution of an administrative operation θ under F follows the
relation F JθK ⇓ F ′JrK over next policies F ′ and results r.
(5) W → A : θ
(6) A → W : r if F ⊢W θ and F JθK ⇓ F ′JrK
(6′) A → W : error otherwise
Here A executes θ (perhaps modifying F ) if F specifies that W controls θ. The fol-
lowing protocol, ISd, is obtained by adding similar messages to ISs.
(iii) W → D : θ
(iv) D → W : r if F ⊢W θ and F JθK ⇓ F ′JrK
(iv′) D → W : error otherwise
Unfortunately NSd does not remain secure with respect to ISd. Consider the NSd
pseudo-code below. Informally, acquire κ means “obtain a capability κ” and use κ
means “request execution with κ”; chmod θ means “request access modification θ”;
and success means “detect successful use of a capability”. Here κ is a capability for
an operation op and θ modifies access to op.
t1 acquire κ; chmod θ; use κ; success
t2 chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; success
Now (t1) and (t2) map to the same ISd pseudo-code chmod θ; exec op; success—
informally, exec op means “request execution of op”. Indeed, requesting execution
with κ in NSd amounts to requesting execution of op in ISd, so the refinement map
must erase instances of acquire and replace instances of use with the appropriate
instances of exec. However, suppose that initially no user has access to op, and θ
specifies that all users may access op. Then (t1) and (t2) can be distinguished by
testing the event success. In (t1) κ does not authorize access to op, so success must
be false; but in (t2) κ may authorize access to op, so success may be true.
Moreover, if revocation is possible, NSd does not even remain safe with respect to
ISd! Why? Let θ specify that access to op is revoked for some user U , and revoked
be the event that θ is executed (thus modifying the access policy). In ISd, U cannot
execute op after revoked. But in NSd, U can execute op after revoked by using a
capability that it acquires before revoked.
Safety in a special case One way of eliminating the counterexample above is to make
the following assumption:
A1 Accesses cannot be dynamically revoked.
We can then prove the following new result (see Section 6).
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Theorem 2. NSd safely implements ISd assuming (A1).2
The key observation is that with (A1), a user U cannot access op until it can always
access op, so U gains no advantage by acquiring capabilities early.
Safety in the general case Safety breaks with revocation. However, we can recover
safety by introducing time. LetA and S share a logical clock (or counter) that measures
time, and let the same clock appear in D. We have that:
R5 Any capability that is produced at time Clk expires at time Clk+ 1.
R6 Any administrative operation requested at time Clk is executed at the next clock
tick (to time Clk+ 1), so that policies in NSd and ISd may change only at clock
ticks (and not between).
We call this arrangement a “midnight-shift scheme”, since the underlying idea is the
same as that of periodically shifting guards at a museum or a bank. Implementing
this scheme is straightforward. For (R5), capabilities carry timestamps. For (R6),
administrative operations are executed on an “accumulator” Ξ instead of F , and at
every clock tick, F is updated to Ξ. Accordingly, we modify the following messages
in NSd to obtain the protocol NSd+.
(2) A → U : mac(〈U, op,Clk〉,KAS) if F ⊢U op
(2′) A → U : mac(〈U, op,Clk〉,KAS) otherwise
(4) S → V : r if κ = mac(〈 , op,Clk〉,KAS)
and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
(6) A → W : r if F ⊢W θ and ΞJθK ⇓ Ξ′JrK
Likewise, we modify the following message in ISd to obtain the protocol ISd+.
(iv) D → W : r if F ⊢W θ and ΞJθK ⇓ Ξ′JrK
Now a capability that carries Clk as its timestamp certifies a particular access decision
at the instant Clk: the meaning is made explicit in the content, which is good practice.
However, recall that MACs can be decoded to retrieve their messages. In particular,
one can tell the time in NSd+ by decoding capabilities. Clearly we require that:
R7 If it is possible to tell the time in NSd+, it must also be possible to do so in ISd+.
So we must make it possible to tell the time in ISd+. (The alternative is to make it
impossible to tell the time in NSd+, by encrypting the timestamps carried by capabil-
ities. Recall that the notion of “time” here is purely logical.) Accordingly we add the
following messages to ISd+.
(v) U → D : ()
(vi) D → U : Clk
The following result can then be proved (cf. [11]).
2Some implementation details, such as (R3), are not required for safety.
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Theorem 3. NSd+ safely implements ISd+.
This result appears in [11]. Unfortunately, the definition of safety in [11] is rather non-
standard. Moreover, beyond this result, security is not considered in [11]. In the rest of
this section, we analyze the difficulties that arise for security, and present new results.
It turns out that there are several recipes to break security, and expiry of capabilities
is a common ingredient. Clearly, using an expired capability has no counterpart in
ISd+. So:
R8 Any use of an expired capability must block (without any observable effect).
Indeed, security breaks without (R8). Consider the NSd+ pseudo-code below. Infor-
mally, stale means “detect any use of an expired capability”. Here κ is a capability
for operation op.
t3 acquire κ; use κ; stale
Without (R8), (t3) can be distinguished from a false event by testing the event stale.
But consider implementation instancesQ1 andQ2 with op as the only operation, whose
execution has no observable effect on the store; let Q1 run (t3) and Q2 run false.
Since stale cannot be reproduced in the specification, it must map to false. So the
specification instances of Q1 and Q2 run exec op; false and false. These instances
cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, expiry of a capability yields the information that time has elapsed be-
tween the acquisition and use of that capability. We may expect that leaking this infor-
mation is harmless; after all, the elapse of time can be trivially detected by inspecting
timestamps. Then why should we care about such a leak? If the adversary knows that
the clock has ticked at least once, it also knows that any pending administrative oper-
ations have been executed, possibly modifying the access policy. If this information is
leaked in a way that cannot be reproduced in the specification, we are in trouble. Any
such way allows the adversary to implicitly control the expiry of a capability before its
use. (Explicit controls, such as comparison of timestamps, are not problematic, since
they can be reproduced in the specification.)
For instance, consider the NSd+ pseudo-code below. Here κ and κ′ are capabilities
for operations op and op ′, and θ modifies access to op.
t4 acquire κ′;
chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; success;
use κ′; success
t5 chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; success;
acquire κ′; use κ′; success
Both (t4) and (t5) map to the same ISd+ pseudo-code
chmod θ; exec op; success; exec op′; success
But suppose that initially no user has access to op and all users have access to op′, and
θ specifies that all users may access op. The intermediate success event is true only
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if θ is executed; therefore it “forces” time to elapse for progress. Now (t4) and (t5) can
be distinguished by testing the final success event. In (t4) κ′ must be stale when used,
so the event must be false; but in (t5) κ′ may be fresh when used, so the event may be
true. Therefore, security breaks.
Security in a special case One way of plugging such leaks is to consider that the
elapse of time is altogether unobservable. (This prospect is not as shocking as it sounds,
since here “time” is simply the value of a privately maintained counter.)
We expect that executing an operation has some observable effect. Now if ini-
tially a user does not have access to an operation, but that access can be dynamically
granted, then the elapse of time can be detected by observing the effect of executing
that operation. So we must assume that:
A2 Accesses cannot be dynamically granted.
On the other hand, we must allow accesses to be dynamically revoked, since otherwise
the access policy becomes static. Now if initially a user has access to an operation, but
that access can be dynamically revoked, then it is possible to detect the elapse of time
if the failure to execute that operation is observable. So we must assume that:
A3 Any unsuccessful use of a capability blocks (without any observable effect).
Let us now try to adapt the counterexample above with (A2) and (A3). Suppose that
initially all users have access to op and op′, and θ specifies that no user may access
op. Consider the NSd+ pseudo-code below. Informally, failure means “detect un-
successful use of a capability”.
t6 acquire κ′;
chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; failure;
use κ′; success
t7 chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; failure;
acquire κ′; use κ′; success
Both (t6) and (t7) map to the same ISd+ pseudo-code
chmod θ; exec op; failure; exec op′; success
Fortunately, now (t6) and (t7) cannot be distinguished, since the intermediate failure
event cannot be observed if true. (In contrast, recall that the intermediate success
event in (t4) and (t5) forces a distinction between them.)
Indeed, with (A2) and (A3) there remains no way to detect the elapse of time,
except by comparing timestamps. To prevent the latter, we assume that:
A4 Timestamps are encrypted.
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Let EAS be a secret key shared by A and S. The encryption of a term M with EAS un-
der a random coin m is written as {m,M}EAS . We remove message (4′) and modify
the following messages in NSd+ to obtain the protocol NSd−. (Note that randomiza-
tion takes care of (R4), so capabilities are not required to mention users here.)
(2) A → U : mac(〈U, op, {m,Clk}EAS〉,KAS)
if F ⊢U op
(2′) A → U : mac(〈U, op, {m,Clk}EAS〉,KAS)
otherwise
(4) S → V : r if κ = mac(〈 , op, T 〉,KAS),
T = { ,Clk}EAS , and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
Accordingly, we remove the messages (iv′), (v), and (vi) from ISd+ to obtain the
protocol ISd−. We can then prove the following new result (see Section 6):
Theorem 4. NSd− securely implements ISd− assuming (A2), (A3), and (A4).
The key observation is that with (A2), (A3), and (A4), time can stand still (so that
capabilities never expire).
Security in the general case More generally, we may consider plugging problem-
atic leaks by static analysis. (Any such analysis must be incomplete because of the
undecidability of the problem.) However, several complications arise in this case.
• The adversary can control the elapse of time by interacting with honest users in
subtle ways. Such interactions lead to counterexamples of the same flavor as the
one with (t4) and (t5) above, but are difficult to prevent statically without severely
restricting the code run by honest users. For instance, even if the suspicious-looking
pseudo-code chmod θ; acquire κ; use κ; success in (t4) and (t5) is replaced by
an innocuous pair of inputs on a public channel c, the adversary can still run the
same code in parallel and serialize it by a pair of outputs on c (which serve as
“begin/end” signals).
• Even if we restrict the code run by honest users, such that every use of a capability
can be serialized immediately after its acquisition, the adversary can still force time
to elapse after a capability is sent to the file system and before it is examined.
Unless we have a way to constrain this elapse of time, we are in trouble.
To see how the adversary can break security by interacting with honest users, consider
the NSd+ pseudo-code below. Here κ is a capability for operation op , and θ modifies
access to op; further c() and w〈〉 denote input and output on public channels c and w.
t8 acquire κ; use κ; c(); chmod θ; c(); success;w〈〉
t9 c(); c();w〈〉
Although use κ immediately follows acquire κ in (t8), the delay between use κ and
success can be detected by the adversary to force time to elapse between those events.
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Suppose that initially no user has access to op or op′, θ specifies that a honest user U
may access op, and θ′ specifies that all users may access op′. Consider the following
context. Here κ′0 and κ′1 are capabilities for op′.
c〈〉; acquire κ′0; use κ
′
0; failure;
chmod θ′; acquire κ′1; use κ
′
1; success; c〈〉
This context forces time to elapse between a pair of outputs on c. The context can
distinguish (t8) and (t9) by testing output on w: in (t8) κ does not authorize ac-
cess to op, so success is false and there is no output on w; on the other hand, in
(t9) there is. Security breaks as a consequence. Consider implementation instances
Q1 and Q2 with U as the only honest user and op and op ′ as the only operations,
such that only U can detect execution of op and all users can detect execution of
op′; let Q1 run (t8) and Q2 run (t9). The specification instances of Q1 and Q2 run
exec op; c(); chmod θ; c(); success;w〈〉 and c(); c();w〈〉, which cannot be distin-
guished: the execution of op can always be delayed until θ is executed, so that success
is true and there is an output on w. Intuitively, an execution request in NSd+ commits
to a time bound (specified by the timestamp of the capability used for the request)
within which that request must be processed for progress; but operation requests in
ISd+ make no such commitment.
To solve this problem, we must assume that:
A5 In ISd+ a time bound is specified for every operation request, so that the request
is dropped if it is not processed within that time bound.
Usual (unrestricted) requests now carry a time bound ∞. Accordingly we modify the
following messages in ISd+.
(i) V → D : (op, T )
(ii) D → V : r if Clk ≤ T ,
F ⊢V op, and ρJopK ⇓ ρ′JrK
With (A5), using an expired capability now has a counterpart in ISd+. Informally, if
a capability for an operation op is produced at time T in NSd+, then any use of that
capability in NSd+ maps to an execution request for op in ISd+ with time bound T .
There remains no fundamental difference between NSd+ and ISd+. We can then prove
our main new result (see Section 6):
Theorem 5 (Main theorem). NSd+ securely implements ISd+ assuming (A5).3
Fortunately, (A5) seems to be a reasonable requirement, and we impose that require-
ment implicitly in the sequel.
Discussion Let us now revisit the principles developed in Sections 2 and 3, and dis-
cuss some alternatives.
First recall (R3), where we introduce fake capabilities to prevent premature leaks
of information about the access policy F . It is reasonable to consider that we do not
3This result holds with or without (R8).
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care about such leaks, and wish to keep the original message (2′) in NS s. But then we
must allow those leaks in the specification. For instance, we can make F public. More
practically, we can add messages to IS s that allow a user to know whether it has access
to a particular operation.
Next recall (R5) and (R6), where we introduce the midnight-shift scheme. This
scheme can be relaxed to allow different capabilities to expire after different intervals,
so long as administrative operations that affect their correctness are not executed before
those intervals elapse. Let delay be a function over users U , operations op, and clock
values Clk that produces time intervals. We may have that:
R5 Any capability for U and op that is produced at time Clk expires at time Clk +
delay(U, op,Clk).
R6 If an administrative operation affects the access decision for U and op and is re-
quested in the interval Clk, . . . ,Clk+delay(U, op,Clk)−1, it is executed at the
clock tick to time Clk+ delay(U, op,Clk).
This scheme remains sound, since any capability for U and op that is produced at Clk
and expires at Clk+delay(U, op,Clk) certifies a correct access decision for U and op
between Clk, . . . ,Clk+ delay(U, op,Clk)− 1.
Finally, the implementation details in Sections 2 and 3 are far from unique. Guided
by the same underlying principles, we can design capabilities in various other ways.
For instance, we may have an implementation that does not require KAS : any capa-
bility is of the form mac(〈〈U, op,Clk〉, {m,L}EAS〉,KAS), where m is a fresh nonce
andL is the predicate F ⊢U op. Although this design involves more cryptography than
the one in NSd+, it reflects better practice: the access decision for U and op under F
is explicit in the content of any capability that certifies that decision. What does this
design buy us? Consider applications where the access decision is not a boolean, but a
label, a decision tree, or some arbitrary data structure. The design in NSd+ requires a
different signing key for each value of the access decision. Since the number of such
keys may be infinite, verification of capabilities becomes very inefficient. The design
above is appropriate for such applications, and we develop it further in Section 7.
4 Definitions and proof techniques
Let us now develop formal definitions and proof techniques for security and safety;
these serve as background for Section 6, where we present formal models and proofs
for security and safety of NSd+ with respect to ISd+.
Let  be a precongruence on processes and ≃ be the associated congruence. A
process P under a context ϕ is written as ϕ[P ]. Contexts act as tests for behaviors, and
P  Q means that any test that is passed by P is passed by Q—in other words, “P has
no more behaviors than Q”.
We describe an implementation as a binary relation R over processes, which re-
lates specification instances to implementation instances. This relation conveniently
generalizes a refinement map [4].
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Definition 3 (Full abstraction). An implementationR is fully abstract if it satisfies:
(PRESERVATION)
∀(P,Q) ∈ R. ∀(P ′, Q′) ∈ R. P  P ′ ⇒ Q  Q′
(REFLECTION)
∀(P,Q) ∈ R. ∀(P ′, Q′) ∈ R. Q  Q′ ⇒ P  P ′
(PRESERVATION) and (REFLECTION) are respectively soundness and completeness of
the implementation under . Security only requires soundness.
Definition 4 (cf. Definition 2 [Security]). An implementation is secure if it satisfies
(PRESERVATION).
Intuitively, a secure implementation does not introduce any interesting behaviors—if
(P,Q) and (P ′, Q′) are in a secure R and P has no more behaviors than P ′, then Q
has no more behaviors than Q′. A fully abstract implementation moreover does not
eliminate any interesting behaviors.
Any subset of a secure implementation is secure. Security implies preservation of
≃. Finally, testing itself is trivially secure since  is closed under any context.
Proposition 6. Let ϕ be any context. Then {(P, ϕ[P ]) | P ∈ W} is secure for any set
of processes W .
On the other hand, a context may eliminate some interesting behaviors by acting as a
test for those behaviors. A fully abstract context does not; it merely translates behav-
iors.
Definition 5 (Fully abstract context). A context ϕ is fully abstract for a set of processes
W if {(P, ϕ[P ]) | P ∈ W} is fully abstract.
A fully abstract context can be used as a wrapper to account for any benign differences
between the implementation and the specification. An implementation is safe if it does
not introduce any behaviors modulo such a wrapper.
Definition 6 (cf. Definition 1 [Safety]). An implementation R is safe if there exists a
fully abstract context φ for the set of specification instances such that R satisfies:
(INCLUSION)
∀(P,Q) ∈ R. Q  φ[P ]
Let us see why φ must be fully abstract in the definition. Suppose that it is not. Then
for some P and P ′ we have φ[P ]  φ[P ′] and P 6 P ′. Intuitively, φ “covers up”
the behaviors of P that are not included in the behaviors of P ′. Unfortunately, those
behaviors may be unsafe. For instance, let P ′ be a pi calculus process [20] that does not
contain public channels, and {P ′} be the set of specification instances—we consider
any output on a public channel to be unsafe. Let c be a public channel; let P = c〈〉;P ′
and φ = • | ! c〈〉. Then P 6 P ′ and φ[P ]  φ[P ′], as required. But clearly P is
unsafe by our assumptions; yet P  φ[P ′], so that by definition {(P ′, P )} is safe! The
definition therefore becomes meaningless.
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We now present some proof techniques. A direct proof of security requires map-
pings between subsets of. Those mappings may be difficult to define and manipulate.
Instead a security proof may be built modularly by showing simulations, as in a safety
proof. Such a proof requires simpler mappings between processes.
Proposition 7 (Proof of security). Let φ andψ be contexts such that for all (P,Q) ∈ R,
Q  φ[P ], P  ψ[Q], and φ[ψ[Q]]  Q. Then R is secure.
Proof. Suppose that (P,Q) ∈ R, P  P ′, and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R. Then Q  φ[P ] 
φ[P ′]  φ[ψ[Q′]]  Q′.
Intuitively, R is secure if R and R−1 both satisfy (INCLUSION), and the witnessing
contexts “cancel” each other. A simple technique for proving full abstraction for con-
texts follows as a corollary.
Corollary 8 (Proof of full abstraction for contexts). Let there be a context ϕ−1 such
that for all P ∈ W , ϕ−1[ϕ[P ]] ≃ P . Then ϕ is a fully abstract context for W .
Proof. Take φ = ϕ−1 andψ = ϕ in the proposition above to show that {(ϕ[P ], P ) | P ∈
W} is secure. The converse follows by Proposition 6.
Theory for the applied pi calculus Let a, b, . . . range over names, u, v, . . . over
names and variables, M,N, . . . over terms, and A,B, . . . over extended processes.
Semantic relations include the binary relations≡,→, and ℓ−→ over extended processes
(structural equivalence, reduction, and labeled transition); here labels ℓ are of the form
a(M˜) or (νu˜)a〈v˜〉 (where a /∈ u˜ and u˜ ⊆ v˜). Both → and ℓ−→ are closed under≡ and
→ is closed under arbitrary evaluation contexts.
We recall some theory on may testing for applied pi calculus programs.
Definition 7 (Barb). A barb ↓a is a predicate that tests possible output on a; we write
A ↓a if A (νeu) a〈ev〉−→ B for some B, v˜, and u˜. A weak barb ⇓a tests possible eventual
output on a, i.e., ⇓a ,→⋆↓a.
Definition 8 (Frame). Let A be closed. Then we have A ≡ (νa˜)(σ | P ) for some a˜, σ,
and P such that fv(rng(σ)) ∪ fv(P ) = ∅; define frame(A) ≡ (νa˜) σ.
Definition 9 (Static equivalence). Let A and B be closed. Then A is statically equiv-
alent to B, written A ≈s B, if there exists a˜, σ, and σ′ such that frame(A) ≡ (νa˜) σ,
frame(B) ≡ (νa˜) σ′, dom(σ) = dom(σ′), and for all M and N ,
{a˜} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ ⇒ Mσ = Nσ ⇔Mσ′ = Nσ′
Proposition 9. A ≈s B if and only if frame(A) ≃ frame(B).
Proof. By induction on the structure of closing evaluation contexts.
We can prove by showing a simulation relation that approximates.
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Definition 10 (Simulation preorder). Let 4 be the largest relation S such that for all
A and B, (A,B) ∈ S implies
• A ≈s B
• ∀A′. A→ A′ ⇒ ∃B′. B →⋆ B′ ∧ (A′, B′) ∈ S
• ∀A′, α. A
ℓ
−→ A′ ⇒ ∃B′. B →⋆
ℓ
−→→⋆ B′ ∧ (A′, B′) ∈ S
Proposition 10 (Proof of testing precongruence). 4⊆.
5 Models and proofs for static access policies
We now present implementation and specification models and security proofs for static
access policies. Models and proofs for dynamic access policies follow essentially the
same routine, and are presented in the next section.
5.1 Preliminaries
We fix an equational theory Σ with the following properties.
• Σ includes a theory of natural numbers with symbols 0 (zero), +1 (successor),
and ≤ (less than or equal to).
• Σ includes a theory of finite tuples with symbols 〈 , 〉 (indexed concatenate) and
. (indexed project).
• Σ contains exactly one equation that involves the symbol mac, which is
msg(mac(x, y)) = x
Clients are identified by natural numbers; we fix a finite subset I of N and consider
any user not identified in I to be dishonest.
File-system code and other processes are conveniently modeled by parameterized
process expressions, whose semantics are defined (recursively) by extending the usual
semantic relations≡, →, and ℓ−→.
5.2 Models
Figures 1 and 2 show applied pi calculus models for the file systems under study. We
ignore the rules in the inner boxes in these figures (labeled (DUMMY...)) in a first
reading.
Figure 1 models a traditional file system (with local access control). The file system
is parameterized by an access policy F , a store ρ, and a renaming η of its default
interface. That interface includes a channel β◦k for every k ∈ N; intuitively, a user
identified by k may send operation requests on this channel.
Processes Reqk(F, op, n) and EOk(M, op, n) denote internal states. In the equa-
tional theory auth(F, k, op) = ok means that user k may access op under F , and
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(OP REQ)
k ∈ N
TFS(F, ρ)η ≡ η(β◦k)(op, x);Reqk(F, op, x)
η | TFS(F, ρ)η
(OP OK)
perm(F, k, op) = L
Reqk(F, op,M)→ EOk(L, op,M)
(OP EXEC)
exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉
EOk(L, op,M) | TFS(F, ρ)η →M〈N〉 | TFS(F, ρ′)η
(DUMMY AUTH REQ)
j ∈ N\I

TS
NAS
η
≡ η(αj)(op, x);x〈mac(〈j, op〉,K?)〉 | 
TS
NAS
η
(DUMMY EXEC REQ)
j ∈ N\I

TS
NAS
η
≡ η(βj)(κ, x);DReq(κ, x)
η | TSNAS
η
(DUMMY OP REQ)
κ = mac(msg(κ), K?)
msg(κ) = 〈j, op〉 j ∈ N\I
DReq(κ,M)η → η(β◦j )〈op,M〉
Figure 1: A traditional file system with local access control
(AUTH REQ)
k ∈ N
NAFS(F, ρ)η ≡ η(αk)(op, x);CReqk(F, op, x) | NAFS(F, ρ)
η
(AUTH CAP)
cert(F, k, op) = κ
CReqk(F, op,M)→M〈κ〉
(EXEC REQ)
k ∈ N
NAFS(F, ρ)η ≡ η(βk)(κ, x);Req(κ, x) | NAFS(F, ρ)
η
(OP OK)
verif(κ) = L L ∈ {true, false}
msg(κ) = 〈 , op〉
Req(κ,M) → EOk(L, op,M)
(OP EXEC)
exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉
EOk(L, op,M) | NAFS(F, ρ)η →M〈N〉 | NAFS(F, ρ′)η
(DUMMY OP REQ)
j ∈ N\I

NAS
TS
η
≡ η(β◦j )(op, x);DReqj(op, x)
η | NASTS
η
(DUMMY AUTH & EXEC REQ)
DReqj(op,M)
η ≡ (νc) η(αj)〈op, c〉; c(κ); η(βj)〈κ,M〉
Figure 2: A network-attached file system with distributed access control
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exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉 means that the execution of op on store ρ under decision L
returns N and store ρ′. Decisions are derived by perm( , , ) as follows.
L = true if auth(F, k, op) = ok, = false otherwise
perm(F, k, op) , L
A traditional storage system may be described as
(νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(C | IFS(F, ρ))
Here C is code run by honest users; the file-system exports the default interface (im-
plicitly renamed by “identity”), and channels associated with honest users are hidden
from the context. The context may be arbitrary and is left implicit; in particular, chan-
nels associated with dishonest users are available to the context.
Figure 2 models a network-attached file system (with distributed access control).
As above, the file system is parameterized by an access policy F , a store ρ, and a
renaming η of its default interface. That interface includes channels αk and βk for
every k ∈ N; intuitively, a user identified by k may send authorization requests on αk
and execution requests on βk.
Processes CReqk(F, op, c), Req(κ, n), and EOk(M, op, n) denote internal states.
In the equational theory auth(F, k, op) = ok and exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉 have the
same meanings as above. Capabilities and decisions are derived by cert( , , ) and
verif( ) as follows.
a = KMD if auth(F, k, op) = ok, = K ′M otherwise
cert(F, k, op) , mac(〈k, op〉, a)
L = true if κ = mac(msg(κ),KMD), = false if κ = mac(msg(κ),K ′M )
verif(κ) , L
A network-attached storage system may be described as
(νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M ) NAFS(F, ρ))
As above, C is code run by honest users; the file-system exports the default interface
and hides the keys that authenticate capabilities. Channels associated with honest users
are hidden from the context. The context may be arbitrary and is left implicit; in
particular, channels associated with dishonest users are available to the context.
5.3 Proofs of security
We prove that the implementation is secure, safe, and fully abstract with respect to the
specification. We begin by outlining the proofs, and then present details.
5.3.1 Outline
Let F , ρ, and C range over access policies, stores, and code for honest users that
are “wellformed” in the implementation. Let ⌈ ⌉ abstract such F , ρ, and C in the
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fn(M) ∩ (A∪ {αj , βj | j ∈ N\I}) = ∅
⌈M⌉ = M
⌈P ⌉Γ = Q Γ ⊇ {αj , βj | j ∈ N\I}
⌈P ⌉ = Q
dom(Γ) ⊇ A
⌈0⌉Γ = 0
n /∈ dom(Γ)
⌈(νn) P ⌉Γ = (νn) ⌈P ⌉Γ
⌈P | Q⌉Γ = ⌈P ⌉Γ | ⌈Q⌉Γ ⌈!P ⌉Γ = !⌈P ⌉Γ
fnv(u, ex) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈u(ex);P ⌉Γ = u(ex); ⌈P ⌉Γ
fnv(u, fM) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈u〈fM〉;P ⌉ = u〈fM〉; ⌈P ⌉
fnv(M,N) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈if M = N then P elseQ⌉Γ = if M = N then ⌈P ⌉Γ else ⌈Q⌉Γ
i ∈ I
fnv(c, x) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅ c /∈ fn(P )
⌈(νc) αi〈op, c〉; c(x);P ⌉Γ = ⌈P ⌉Γ,x:Cert(i,op)
{i, i′} ⊆ I Γ(x) = Cert(i′, op)
fnv(op,M) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈βi〈x,M〉;P ⌉Γ = β◦i′〈op,M〉; ⌈P ⌉Γ
Figure 3: Abstraction function
specification. We define
R =
⋃
F,ρ,C
{(νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉)) , (νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M )NAFS(F, ρ))}
We prove that R is secure by showing contexts φ and ψ such that:
Lemma 11. For any F , ρ, and C,
1. (νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M )NAFS(F, ρ))  φ[(νi∈Iβ◦i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))]
2. (νi∈Iβ◦i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))  ψ[(νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M )NAFS(F, ρ))]
3. φ[ψ[(νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M ) NAFS(F, ρ))]]
 (νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M ) NAFS(F, ρ))
Proposition 7 then applies. Moreover we show:
Lemma 12. For any F , ρ, and C,
ψ[φ[(νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))]]  (νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))
Now R−1 is secure by Proposition 7. Thus R is proved fully abstract. Moreover
Lemmas 11.1–2 already imply the converse of Lemma 12; so φ is a fully abstract
context by Corollary 8 (taking φ−1 = ψ). Thus R is proved safe.
We now revisit Figures 1 and 2 and focus on the rules in the inner boxes. Those
rules define processes TSNAS and NASTS . Intuitively, these processes translate public
requests from NASs to TS s and from TS s to NASs. Let a˜TS and a˜NAS include the
public interfaces of TS s and NAS s. We define
φ = (νa˜TS) (• | 
TS
NAS)
ψ = (νa˜NAS) (• | 
NAS
TS )
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fn(κ,M) ∩A = ∅
Req(κ,M) S ′F1 DReq(κ,M)
η2
k ∈ N fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
Req(cert(F, k, op),M) S ′F1 Reqk(F, op,M)
fn(L, op,M) ∩A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) S ′F1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(L, op,M) ∩A = ∅
CReqj(F, op,M) S
′F
1 M〈mac(〈j, op〉,K?)〉
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr S
′F
1 Qr fn(ρ) ∩ A = ∅
NAFS(F, ρ) | Πr∈LPr S
F
1 TFS(F, ρ)
η2 | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
∀x. x ∈ dom(σ) ⇒ ∃i ∈ I, op. Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = cert(F, i, op)
Cσ SΓ,F2 ⌈C⌉Γ
i ∈ I P SΓ,F2 Q Γ(x) = Cert(i, op)
(νc)(c(x);P | CReqi(F, op, c)) S
F
3 Q
i ∈ I P SΓ,F2 Q Γ(x) = Cert(i, op)
(νc)(c(x);P | c〈cert(F, i, op)〉) SF3 Q
(TRUSTED CODE)
P SF1 Q P
′ SΓ,F2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pr S
F
3 Qr
(νi∈Iαiβi)(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) S
′F (νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(SYSTEM CODE)
P S ′F Q ∀x,N. (∃σ′. σ ≡ {N/x} | σ
′) ⇒ N :F Export
(νen)(νKMDK
′
M )(σ | P ) S (νen)(νK?)(η3(σ) | (νj∈N\Iβ
◦
j ?
)(Q | TSNAS
η2
))
Figure 4: Simulation relation for Lemma 11.1 ( 4 φ[ ])
The abstraction function ⌈ ⌉ is shown in Figure 3. Here A contains special names
whose uses in well-formed code are either disciplined or forbidden.
A , {αi, βi | i ∈ I} ∪ {αj?, βj?, β
◦
j ?
| j ∈ N\I} ∪ {KMD,K
′
M ,K?}
The names in {αj?, βj?, β
◦
j ?
| j ∈ N\I}∪{K?} are invented to simplify proofs below.
5.3.2 Simulation relations
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show simulation relations for Lemma 11.1–3. All these relations
are closed under ≡. Here η1 and η2 rename the public interfaces of NASs and TS s
and η3 renames the private authentication keys KMD and K ′M .
η1 , [αj 7→ αj?, βj 7→ βj? | j ∈ N\I]
η2 , [β
◦
j 7→ β
◦
j ?
| j ∈ N\I]
η3 , [a 7→ K? | a ∈ {KMD,K
′
M}]
These renamings map to names in A that do not occur in wellformed code (see Fig-
ure 3). In particular, the purpose of η1 and η2 is to rename some public channels to
fresh ones that can be hidden by restriction in ψ and φ. (A similar purpose is served by
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k ∈ N fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
Reqk(F, op,M) T
′
1 Req(cert(F, k, op),M)
fn(L, op,M) ∩ A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) T ′1 EOk(L, op,M)
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr T
′
1 Qr fn(ρ) ∩A = ∅
TFS(F, ρ) | Πr∈LPr T
F
1 NAFS(F, ρ)
η1 | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
∀x. x ∈ dom(σ) ⇒ ∃i ∈ I, op. Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = cert(F, i, op)
⌈C⌉Γ T
F
2 Cσ
(SYSTEM CODE)
P1 T
F
1 Q1 P2 T
F
2 Q2
P = (νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(P1 | P2) Q = (νi∈Iαiβi)(νKMDK
′
M )(Q1 | Q2)
(νen)(σ | P ) T (νen)(σ | (νj∈N\Iαj?βj?)(Q | 
NAS
TS
η1
))
Figure 5: Simulation relation for Lemma 11.2 ( 4 ψ[ ])
quantification in logic.) Hiding those names strengthens Lemmas 11.1–2 while not af-
fecting their proofs; but more importantly, the restrictions are required to prove Lemma
11.3. Further the purpose of η3 is to abstract terms that may be available to contexts.
Such terms must be of type Export; intuitively, KMD and K ′M may appear only as
authentication keys in capabilities issued to dishonest users.
N = N ′σ {KMD,K
′
M ,K?} ∩ fn(N
′) = ∅
∀L ∈ rng(σ). ∃j ∈ N\I, op. L = cert(F, j, op) ∧ op :F Export
N :F Export
We show that term abstraction preserves equivalence in the equational theory.
Lemma 13. Suppose that M :F Export and N :F Export. Then M = N iff
η3(M) = η3(N).
This lemma is required to show static equivalence in proofs of soundness for the
relations S, T , and U in Figures 4, 5, and 6, which in turn lead to Lemma 11. We prove
that those relations are included in the simulation preorder.
Lemma 14. S ⊆4, T ⊆4, and U ⊆4.
Intuitively, by S a network-attached storage system may be simulated by a tradi-
tional storage system by forwarding public requests directed at NAFS to a hidden TFS
interface (via φ). Symmetrically, by T a traditional storage system may be simulated
by a network-attached storage system by forwarding public requests directed at TFS
to a hidden NAFS interface (via ψ). Finally, by U a network-attached storage system
may simulate another network-attached storage system by filtering requests directed at
NAFS through a hidden TFS interface before forwarding them to a hidden NAFS inter-
face (via φ[ψ]). This rather mysterious detour forces a fresh capability to be acquired
for every execution request.
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fn(κ,M) ∩ A = ∅
DReq(κ,M)η2 U ′F1 Req(κ,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅
β◦j ?〈op,M〉 U
′F
1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
DReqj(op,M)
η1⊕η2 U ′F1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
(νc)(c(x);βj?〈x,M〉 | CReqj(F, op, c)) U
′F
1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
(νc)(c(x);βj?〈x,M〉 | c〈cert(F, j, op)〉) U
′F
1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
βj?〈cert(F, j, op),M〉 U
′F
1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
Req(cert(F, j, op),M) U ′F1 Req(cert(F, j, op),M)
fn(L, op,M) ∩ A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) U ′F1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅
M〈mac(〈j, op〉,K?)〉 U
′F
1 CReqj(F, op,M)
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr U
′F
1 Qr fn(ρ) ∩A = ∅

TS
NAS
η2
| NASTS
η1⊕η2
| NAFS(F, ρ)η1 | Πr∈LPr U
F
1 NAFS(F, ρ) | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
⌈C⌉Γ = C
◦ ∀x. x ∈ dom(σ) ⇒ ∃i ∈ I, op. Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = cert(F, i, op)
Cσ UΓ,F2 Cσ
i ∈ I P UΓ,F2 Q Γ(x) = Cert(i, op)
(νc)(c(x);P | CReqi(F, op, c)) U
F
3 (νc)(c(x);Q | CReqi(F, op, c))
(TRUSTED CODE)
P UF1 Q P
′ UF2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pr U
F
3 Qr
(νi∈Iαiβi)(νKMDK
′
M )(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) U
′F (νi∈Iαiβi)(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(SYSTEM CODE)
P U ′F Q ∀x,N. (∃σ′. σ ≡ {N/x} | σ
′) ⇒ N :F Export
(νen)(νK?)(η3(σ) | (νj∈N\Iβ
◦
j ?
αj?βj?) P ) U (νen)(νKMDK
′
M )(σ | Q)
Figure 6: Simulation relation for Lemma 11.3 (φ[ψ[ ]] 4 )
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j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
DReqj(op,M) V
′F
1 Reqj(op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩A = ∅
N = mac(〈j, op〉,K?)
(νc)(c(κ);βj?〈κ,M〉 | c〈N〉) V
′F
1 Reqj(op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
N = mac(〈j, op〉,K?) L = perm(F, j, op)
βj?〈N,M〉 V
′F
1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅
N = mac(〈j, op〉,K?) L = perm(F, j, op)
DReq(N,M)η1⊕η2 V ′F1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ L = perm(F, j, op)
β◦j ?〈op,M〉 V
′F
1 EOk(L, op,M)
fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) V ′F1 EOk(L, op,M)
fn(adm,M) ∩A = ∅
AReqk(adm,M) V
′F
1 AReqk(adm,M)
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr V
′F
1 Qr fn(ρ) ∩A = ∅

NAS
TS
η1
| TSNAS
η1⊕η2
| TFS(F, ρ)η2 | Πr∈LPr V
F,Clk
1 TFS(F, ρ) | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
⌈C⌉Γ V
F
2 ⌈C⌉Γ
(SYSTEM CODE)
P VF1 Q P
′ VF2 Q
′
P ′′ = (νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(νK?)(P | P
′) Q′′ = (νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(Q | Q
′)
(νen)(σ | (νj∈N\Iβ
◦
j ?
αj?βj?) P
′′) V (νen)(σ | Q′′)
Figure 7: Simulation relation for Lemma 12 (ψ[φ[ ]] 4 )
By definition of ⌈ ⌉ and alphaconversion to default public interfaces, we have for
any F , ρ, and C:
1. (νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M )NAFS(F, ρ)) 4 φ[(νi∈Iβ◦i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))]
2. (νi∈Iβ◦i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉)) 4 ψ[(νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M )NAFS(F, ρ))]
3. φ[ψ[(νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M ) NAFS(F, ρ))]]
4 (νi∈Iαiβi)(C | (νKMDK ′M ) NAFS(F, ρ))
Lemma 11 follows by Proposition 10. ThusR is secure.
Further, Figure 7 shows a simulation relation for Lemma 12. We prove that the
relation V is included in the simulation preorder.
Lemma 15. V ⊆4.
By definition of ⌈ ⌉ and alphaconversion to default public interfaces, we have for
any F , ρ, and C:
ψ[φ[(νi∈Iβ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))]] 4 (νi∈Iβi)(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉, ⌈ρ⌉))
Lemma 12 follows by Proposition 10. ThusR is safe and fully abstract.
22
6 Models and proofs for dynamic access policies
Next we present models and proofs for dynamic access policies, following the routine
of Section 5.
6.1 Models
The models extend those in Section 5, and are shown in Figures 8 and 9. (As usual,
we ignore the rules in the inner boxes in a first reading.) Interfaces are extended with
channels δk and δ◦k for every k, on which users identified by k send administration
requests in the implementation and the specification.
In the equational theory auth(F, k, op) = ok and exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉 have
the same meanings as in Section 5. Capabilities are derived by cert( , , , ) as fol-
lows.
a = KMD if auth(F, k, op) = ok, = K ′M otherwise
cert(F, k, op,Clk) , mac(〈k, op,Clk〉, a)
Recall that administrative operations scheduled at time Clk are executed at the next
clock tick (to Clk + 1). In the equational theory push(L, adm ,Ξ,Clk) = 〈N,Ξ′〉
means that an administrative operation adm pushed on schedule Ξ under decision L at
Clk returns N and the schedule Ξ′; and sync(F,Ξ,Clk) = F ′ means that an access
policy F synchronized under schedule Ξ at Clk returns the access policy F ′.
A traditional storage system may be described as
(νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(C | TFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))
where C is code run by honest users, F is an access policy and ρ is a store; initially the
schedule is empty and the time is 0.
Similarly a network-attached storage system may be described as
(νi∈Iαiβiδ
◦
i )(C | (νKMDK
′
M ) NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))
As usual, let F , ρ, and C range over access policies, stores, and code for honest
users that are “wellformed” in the implementation, and let ⌈ ⌉ abstract such F , ρ, and
C in the specification. We define
R =
⋃
F,ρ,C{ (νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉,∅, 0, ⌈ρ⌉))
(νi∈Iαiβiδi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M ) NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ)) }
Figure 10 shows the abstraction function ⌈ ⌉. Here
A = {αj?, βj?, δj?, α
◦
j ?
, β◦j ?, δ
◦
j ?
| j ∈ N\I}∪{KMD,K
′
M ,K?}∪{αi, βi, δi | i ∈ I}
6.2 Examples of security
At this point we revisit the “counterexamples” in Section 3. By modeling them formally
in this setting, we show that those counterexamples are eliminated.
Recall (t1) and (t2).
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(CLK REQ)
k ∈ N
TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(α◦k)(x);TReq(x) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(TIME)
k ∈ N
TReq(M) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η → M〈Clk〉 | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η
(ADM REQ)
k ∈ N
TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(δ◦k)(adm, x);AReqk(adm, x) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(ADM OK)
perm(F, k, adm) = L push(L, adm,Ξ,Clk) = 〈N,Ξ′〉
AReqk(adm, n) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η → n〈N〉 | TFS(F,Ξ′,Clk, ρ)η
(OP REQ)
k ∈ N
TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(β◦k)(op, τ, x);Reqk(op, τ, x) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(OP OK)
perm(F, k, op) = L Clk ≤ τ
Reqk(op, τ,M) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η → EOk(L, op,M) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η
(OP EXEC)
exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉
EOk(L, op,M) | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η →M〈N〉 | TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ′)η
(TICK)
sync(F,Ξ,Clk) = F ′
TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η → TFS(F ′,Ξ,Clk+ 1, ρ)η
(DUMMY ADM REQ)
j ∈ N\I

TS
NAS
η
≡ η(δj)(op, x); η(δ◦j )〈op, x〉 | 
TS
NAS
η
(DUMMY AUTH REQ)
j ∈ N\I

TS
NAS
η
≡ η(αj)(op, x); (νm) η(α◦j )〈m〉;m(Clk);x〈mac(〈j, op,Clk〉,K?〉 | 
TS
NAS
η
(DUMMY EXEC REQ)
j ∈ N\I

TS
NAS
η
≡ η(βj)(κ, x);DReq(κ, x)
η | TSNAS
η
(DUMMY OP REQ)
κ = mac(msg(κ),K?) msg(κ) = 〈 , op,Clk〉
DReq(κ,M)η → η(β◦j )〈op,Clk,M〉
Figure 8: A traditional file system with local access control
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(ADM REQ)
k ∈ N
NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(δk)(adm, x);AReqk(adm, x) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(ADM OK)
perm(F, k, adm) = L push(L, adm,Ξ,Clk) = 〈N,Ξ′〉
AReqk(adm,M) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η →M〈N〉 | NAFS(F,Ξ′,Clk, ρ)η
(AUTH REQ)
k ∈ N
NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(αk)(op, x);CReqk(op, x) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(AUTH CAP)
cert(F, k, op,Clk) = κ
CReqk(op,M) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η →M〈κ〉 | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η
(EXEC REQ)
k ∈ N
NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η ≡ η(βk)(κ, x);Req(κ, x) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η
(OP OK)
verif(κ) = L L ∈ {true, false} msg(κ) = 〈 , op,Clk〉
Req(κ,M) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η → EOk(L, op,M) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η
(OP EXEC)
exec(L, op, ρ) = 〈N, ρ′〉
EOk(L, op,M) | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η →M〈N〉 | NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ′)η
(TICK)
sync(F,Ξ,Clk) = F ′
NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η → NAFS(F ′,Ξ,Clk+ 1, ρ)η
(DUMMY CLK REQ)
j ∈ N\I

NAS
TS
η
≡ η(α◦j )(x); (νc) η(αj)〈x, c〉; c(y);x〈msg(y).3〉 | 
NAS
TS
η
(DUMMY ADM REQ)
j ∈ N\I

NAS
TS
η
≡ η(δ◦j )(op, x); η(δj)〈op, x〉 | 
NAS
TS
η
(DUMMY OP REQ)
j ∈ N\I

NAS
TS
η
≡ η(β◦j )(op, τ, x); (νc) η(αj)〈op, c〉; c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] η(βj)〈κ, x〉 | 
NAS
TS
η
Figure 9: A network-attached file system with distributed access control
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fn(M) ∩ (A∪ {αj , βj , δj | j ∈ N\I}) = ∅
⌈M⌉ = M
⌈P ⌉Γ = Q Γ ⊇ {αj , βj , δj | j ∈ N\I}
⌈P ⌉ = Q
. . .
i ∈ I fnv(adm,M) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈δi〈adm,M〉;P ⌉Γ = δ◦i 〈adm,M〉; ⌈P ⌉Γ
i ∈ I fnv(c, x) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅ c /∈ fn(P )
⌈(νc) αi〈op, c〉; c(x);P ⌉Γ = (νc) α◦i 〈c〉; c(x); ⌈P ⌉Γ,x:Cert(i,op)
{i, i′} ⊆ I Γ(x) = Cert(i′, op) fnv(op,M) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅
⌈βi〈x,M〉;P ⌉Γ = β◦i′〈op, x,M〉; ⌈P ⌉Γ
Figure 10: Abstraction function
t1 acquire κ; chmod ζ; use κ; success κ
t2 chmod ζ; acquire κ; use κ; success κ
The following fragments of NASd code formalize these traces.
I1 (νc) αi〈op, c〉; c(κ); (νm) δi〈ζ,m〉;m(z); (νn) βi〈κ, n〉;n(x); [success(x)] w〈〉
I2 (νm) δi〈ζ,m〉;m(z); (νc) αi〈op, c〉; c(κ); (νn) βi〈κ, n〉;n(x); [success(x)] w〈〉
This code is abstracted to the following fragments of TSd code.
S1 (νc)α◦i 〈c〉; c(τ); (νm) δ◦i 〈ζ,m〉;m(z); (νn) β◦i 〈op, τ, n〉;n(x); [success(x)]w〈〉
S2 (νm) δ◦i 〈ζ,m〉;m(z); (νc) α◦i 〈c〉; c(τ); (νn) β◦i 〈op, τ, n〉;n(x); [success(x)]w〈〉
Now whenever (I1) and (I2) can be distinguished, so can (S1) and (S2). Indeed the
time bound τ is the same as the timestamp in κ; so (in particular) the operation request
in (S1) is dropped whenever the execution request in (T1) is dropped.
A similar argument counters the “dangerous” example with (t4) and (t5):
t4 acquire κ; chmod ζ′; acquire κ′; use κ′; success κ′; use κ; success κ
t5 chmod ζ′; acquire κ′; use κ′; success κ′; acquire κ; use κ; success κ
Finally, recall (t8) and (t9).
t8 acquire κ; use κ; c(); chmod ζ; c(); success κ;w〈〉
t9 c(); c();w〈〉
The following fragment of NASd code formalizes (t8).
I3 (νm) αi〈op,m〉;m(κ); (νn) βi〈κ, n〉;
c(); (νm) δi〈ζ,m〉;m(z); c();n(x); [success(x)] w〈〉
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This code is abstracted to the following fragment of TSd code.
S3 (νm) α◦i 〈m〉;m(τ); (νn) β◦i 〈op, τ, n〉;
c(); (νm) δ◦i 〈ζ,m〉;m(z); c();n(x); [success(x)] w〈〉
A NASd context distinguishes (I3) and (t9):
c〈〉;αj〈op
′,m0〉;m0(κ
′
0);βj〈κ
′
0, n0〉;n0(x); [failure(x)]
δj〈ζ, p〉;αj〈op
′,m1〉;m1(κ
′
1);βj〈κ
′
1, n1〉;n1(x); [success(x)] c〈〉
But likewise a TSd context distinguishes (S3) and (t9):
c〈〉;αj〈m0〉;m0(τ
′
0);β
◦
j 〈op
′, τ ′0, n0〉;n0(x); [failure(x)]
δ◦j 〈ζ, p〉;α
◦
j 〈m1〉;m1(τ
′
1);β
◦
j 〈op
′, τ ′1, n1〉;n1(x); [success(x)] c〈〉
6.3 Proofs of security
We show that R is secure, safe, and fully abstract. Recall the contexts φ and ψ defined
in Section 5. The processes NASTS and TSNAS are redefined in the inner boxes in Figures
8 and 9. In particular, the rule (DUMMY OP REQ) in Figure 9 translates time-bounded
operation requests by TSd contexts.
Simulation relations for security are shown in Figures 11, 12, and 13, and a simu-
lation relation for safety and full abstraction is shown in Figure 14. Here
η1 , [αj 7→ αj?, βj 7→ βj?, δj 7→ δj? | j ∈ N\I]
η2 , [α
◦
j 7→ α
◦
j ?
, β◦j 7→ β
◦
j ?
, δ◦j 7→ δ
◦
j ?
| j ∈ N\I]
A binary relation ,  , (“leads-to”) is defined over the product of access policies
and clocks. Access policies may change at clock ticks (but not between).
F ′,Clk′  F,Clk , (Clk′ < Clk) ∨ (Clk′ = Clk ∧ F ′ = F )
As usual, any term that may be available to contexts must be of type Export.
N = N ′σ {KMD,K
′
M ,K?} ∩ fn(N
′) = ∅
∀L ∈ rng(σ). ∃j ∈ N\I, op,Clk′. op :F ,F,Clk Export ∧ (F(Clk
′),Clk′  F,Clk)
∧ L = cert(F(Clk′), j, op,Clk′)
N :F ,F,Clk Export
We prove that the relations S, T , and U in Figures 11, 12, and 13 are included in
the simulation preorder. Some interesting points in those proofs are listed below.
• In Section 5, when an operation request is sent in TS s we send an appropriate
authorization request inNASs, obtain a capability, and send an execution request
with that capability (see T in Figure 5). In contrast, here when an operation
request is sent in TSd we wait after sending an appropriate authorization request
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fn(κ,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
Req(κ,M) S ′F,Clk1 DReq(κ,M)
η2
k ∈ N fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
Req(cert(F ′, k, op,Clk′),M) S ′F,Clk1 Reqk(op,Clk
′,M)
fn(L, op,M) ∩ A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) S ′F,Clk1 EOk(L, op,M)
k ∈ N fn(adm,M) ∩ A = ∅
AReqk(adm,M) S
′
1
F,Clk
AReqk(adm,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
CReqj(op,M) S
′F,Clk
1 (νm) α
◦
j ?
〈m〉;m(x);M〈mac(〈j, op, x〉,K?)〉
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr S
′F,Clk
1 Qr fn(Ξ, ρ) ∩ A = ∅
NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ) | Πr∈LPr S
F,Clk
1 TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)
η2 | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
dom(σ) = dom(σ′) = X
∀x. x ∈ X ⇒ ∃F ′,Clk′, i ∈ I, op. (F ′,Clk′  F,Clk) ∧ σ′(x) = Clk′
∧ Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = cert(F ′, i, op,Clk′)
Cσ SΓ,F,Clk2 ⌈C⌉Γσ
′
i ∈ I P SΓ,F,Clk2 Q Γ(x) = Cert(i, op)
(νc)(c(x);P | CReqi(op, c)) S
F,Clk
3 (νc)(c(x);Q | TReq(c))
(TRUSTED CODE)
P SF,Clk1 Q P
′ SΓ,F,Clk2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pr S
F,Clk
3 Qr
(νi∈Iαiβiδi)(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) S
′F,Clk (νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(SYSTEM CODE)
P S ′F,Clk Q ∀x,N. (∃σ′. σ ≡ {N/x} | σ
′) ⇒ N :F,F,Clk Export
(νen)(νKMDK
′
M )(σ | P ) S
F,Clk (νen)(νK?)(η3(σ) | (νj∈N\Iα
◦
j ?
β◦j ?δ
◦
j ?
)(Q | TSNAS))
Figure 11: Simulation relation for Lemma 16.1 ( 4 φ[ ])
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i ∈ I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
Reqi(op,Clk
′,M) T ′1
F,Clk
Req(cert(F ′, k, op,Clk′),M)η1
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩ A = ∅
Reqj(op, τ,M) T
′
1
F,Clk
(νc) αj?〈op, c〉; c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉
fn(L, op,M) ∩A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) T ′1
F,Clk
EOk(L, op,M)η1
k ∈ N fn(adm,M) ∩ A = ∅
AReqk(adm, n) T
′
1
F,Clk
AReqk(adm, n)
η1
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩A = ∅
TReq(M) T ′1
F,Clk
(νc) αj?〈M, c〉; c(x);M〈msg(x).3〉
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr T
′
1
F,Clk
Qr fn(Ξ, ρ) ∩A = ∅
TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ) | Πr∈LPr T1
F,Clk NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η1 | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
dom(σ) = dom(σ′) = X
∀x. x ∈ X ⇒ ∃F ′,Clk′, i ∈ I, op. (F ′,Clk′  F,Clk) ∧ σ(x) = Clk′
∧ Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ′(x) = cert(F ′, i, op,Clk′)
⌈C⌉Γσ T2
Γ,F,Clk Cσ′
i ∈ I P T2
Γ,F,Clk Q Γ(x) = Cert(i, op)
(νc)(c(x);P | TReq(c)) T ′3 (νc)(c(x);Q | CReqi(op, c))
(TRUSTED CODE)
P T F,Clk1 Q P
′ T Γ,F,Clk2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pr T
′
3 Qr
(νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) T
′ (νi∈Iαiβiδi)(νKMDK
′
M )(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(SYSTEM CODE)
P T ′ Q
(νen)(σ | P ) T (νen)(σ | (νj∈N\Iαj?βj?δj?)(Q | 
NAS
TS ))
Figure 12: Simulation relation for Lemma 16.2 ( 4 ψ[ ])
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fn(κ,M) ∩A = ∅
DReq(κ,M)η2 U ′F,Clk1 Req(κ,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
β◦j ?〈op,Clk
′,M〉 U ′F,Clk1 Req(cert(F
′, j, op,Clk′),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
DReqj(op,Clk
′,M)η1⊕η2 U ′F,Clk1 Req(cert(F
′, j, op,Clk′),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
(νc)(c(x); [msg(x).3 ≤ Clk′] βj?〈x,M〉 | CReqj(op, c)) U
′F,Clk
1 Req(cert(F
′, j, op,Clk′),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk N = mac(〈j, op,Clk′〉,K?)
(νc)(c(x); [msg(x).3 ≤ Clk′] βj?〈x,M〉 | c〈N〉) U
′F,Clk
1 Req(cert(F
′, j, op,Clk′),M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
βj?〈mac(〈j, op,Clk
′〉,K?),M〉 U
′F,Clk
1 Req(cert(F
′, j, op,Clk′),M)
k ∈ N fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
Req(mac(〈k, op,Clk′〉,K?),M) U
′F,Clk
1 Req(cert(F
′, k, op,Clk′),M)
fn(L, op,M) ∩A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) U ′F,Clk1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
(νm) α◦j ?〈m〉;m(x);M〈mac(〈j, op, x〉,K?)〉 U
′F,Clk
1 CReqj(op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
(νm) (m(x);M〈mac(〈j, op, x〉,K?)〉 |m〈Clk
′〉) U ′F,Clk1 M〈cert(F
′, k, op,Clk′)〉
fn(adm,M) ∩A = ∅
AReqk(adm,M) U
′F,Clk
1 AReqk(adm,M)
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr U
′F,Clk
1 Qr fn(Ξ, ρ) ∩A = ∅

TS
NAS
η2
| NASTS
η1⊕η2
| NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η1 | Πr∈LPr U
F,Clk
1 NAFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ) | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
⌈C⌉Γ = C
◦
∀x. x ∈ dom(σ) ⇒ ∃F ′,Clk′, i ∈ I, op. (F ′,Clk′  F,Clk)
∧ Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = cert(F ′, i, op,Clk′)
Cσ UΓ,F,Clk2 Cσ
i ∈ I Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) P UΓ,F,Clk2 Q
(νc)(c(x);P | CReqi(op, c)) U
F,Clk
3 (νc)(c(x);Q | CReqi(op, c))
(TRUSTED CODE)
P UF,Clk1 Q P
′ UF,Clk2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pℓ U
F,Clk
3 Qℓ
(νi∈Iαiβiδi)(νKMDK
′
M )(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) U
′F,Clk (νi∈Iαiβiδi)(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(SYSTEM CODE)
P U ′F,Clk Q ∀x,N. (∃σ′. σ ≡ {N/x} | σ
′) ⇒ N :F,F,Clk Export
(νen)(νK?)(η3(σ) | (νj∈N\Iα
◦
j ?
β◦j ?δ
◦
j ?
αj?βj?δj?) P ) U (νen)(νKMDK
′
M )(σ | Q)
Figure 13: Simulation relation for Lemma 16.3 (φ[ψ[ ]] 4 )
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j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩ A = ∅
(νc) αj?〈op, c〉; c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉 V
′F,Clk
1 Reqj(op, τ,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩A = ∅ N = mac(〈j, op, x〉,K?)
(νc)(c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉 | (νm) α
◦
j ?
〈m〉;m(x); c〈N〉) V ′F,Clk1 Reqj(op, τ,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩A = ∅ N = mac(〈j, op, x〉,K?)
(νc)(c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉 | (νm)(m(x); c〈N〉 | TReq(m))) V
′F,Clk
1 Reqj(op, τ,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk N = mac(〈j, op,Clk′〉,K?) L = perm(F
′, j, op)
(νc)(c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉 | (νm)(m(x); c〈N〉 |m〈Clk
′〉)) V ′F,Clk1 [Clk ≤ τ ] EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op, τ,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk L = perm(F ′, j, op)
(νc)(c(κ); [msg(κ).3 ≤ τ ] βj?〈κ,M〉 | c〈mac(〈j, op,Clk
′〉,K?)〉) V
′F,Clk
1 [Clk ≤ τ ] EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
N = mac(〈j, op,Clk′〉,K?) L = perm(F
′, j, op)
βj?〈N,M〉 V
′F,Clk
1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅ F ′,Clk′  F,Clk
N = mac(〈j, op,Clk′〉,K?) L = perm(F
′, j, op)
DReq(N,M)η1⊕η2 V ′F,Clk1 EOk(L, op,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(op,M) ∩ A = ∅
F ′,Clk′  F,Clk L = perm(F ′, j, op)
β◦j ?〈op,Clk
′,M〉 V ′F,Clk1 EOk(L, op,M)
fn(op,M) ∩A = ∅
EOk(L, op,M) V ′F,Clk1 EOk(L, op,M)
fn(adm,M) ∩A = ∅
AReqk(adm,M) V
′F,Clk
1 AReqk(adm,M)
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩ A = ∅
(νc) αj?〈M, c〉; c(y);M〈msg(y).3〉 V
′F,Clk
1 TReq(M)
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩A = ∅
(νc)(c(y);M〈msg(y).3〉 | (νm) α◦j ?〈m〉;m(x); c〈mac(〈j,M, x〉,K?)〉) V
′F,Clk
1 TReq(M)
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩A = ∅
(νc)(c(y);M〈msg(y).3〉 | (νm)(m(x); c〈mac(〈j,M, x〉,K?)〉 | TReq(M))) V
′F,Clk
1 TReq(M)
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩ A = ∅ Clk′ ≤ Clk
(νc)(c(y);M〈msg(y).3〉 | (νm)(m(x); c〈mac(〈j,M, x〉,K?)〉 |m〈Clk
′〉)) V ′F,Clk1 m〈Clk
′〉
j ∈ N\I fn(M) ∩A = ∅
(νc)(c(y);M〈msg(y).3〉 | c〈mac(〈j,M,Clk′〉,K?)〉) V
′F,Clk
1 M〈Clk
′〉
(FILE SYSTEMS)
∀r ∈ L. Pr V
′F,Clk
1 Qr fn(Ξ, ρ) ∩A = ∅

NAS
TS
η1
| TSNAS
η1⊕η2
| TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ)η2 | Πr∈LPr V
F,Clk
1 TFS(F,Ξ,Clk, ρ) | Πr∈LQr
(HONEST USERS)
∀x. x ∈ dom(σ) ⇒ ∃Clk′, i ∈ I, op. Clk′ ≤ Clk ∧ Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) ∧ σ(x) = Clk′
⌈C⌉Γσ V
Γ,F,Clk
2 ⌈C⌉Γσ
i ∈ I Γ(x) = Cert(i, op) P VΓ,F,Clk2 Q
(νc)(c(x);P | TReq(c)) VF,Clk3 (νc)(c(x);Q | TReq(c))
(SYSTEM CODE)
P VF,Clk1 Q P
′ VF,Clk2 Q
′ ∀r ∈ L. Pℓ V
F,Clk
3 Qℓ
P ′′ = (νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(νK?)(P | P
′ | Πr∈LPr) Q
′′ = (νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(Q | Q
′ | Πr∈LQr)
(νen)(σ | (νj∈N\Iα
◦
j ?
β◦j ?δ
◦
j ?
αj?βj?δj?) P
′′) V (νen)(σ | Q′′)
Figure 14: Simulation relation for Lemma 17 (ψ[φ[ ]] 4 )
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in NASd (see T in Figure 12); we continue only when that operation request
in TSd is processed, when we obtain a capability in NASd, send an execution
request with that capability, and process the execution request.
But why wait? Suppose that the operation request in TSd carries a time bound
∞; now if we obtain a capability in NASd before the operation request in TSd
is processed, we commit to a finite time bound, which breaks the simulation.
• As before, φ[ψ] forces a fresh capability to be acquired for every execution re-
quest by filtering execution requests in NASd through TSd and back. When
an execution request is sent in NASd under φ[ψ] we send an execution request
with the same capability in NASd (see U in Figure 13). But under φ[ψ] a fresh
capability is obtained and the execution request is sent again with the fresh capa-
bility. If the capability in the original request expires before the fresh capability,
the simulation breaks. Fortunately operation requests in TSd carry time bounds,
so we can communicate this expiry bound through TSd. In fact there seems to
be no way around this problem unless time bounds can be specified in operation
requests in TSd!
By Proposition 10 we have:
Lemma 16. For any F , ρ, and C,
1. (νi∈Iαiβiδi)(C | (νKMDK ′M ) NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))
 φ[(νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉,∅, 0, ⌈ρ⌉))]
2. (νi∈Iα◦i β◦i δ◦i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉,∅, 0, ⌈ρ⌉))
 ψ[(νi∈Iαiβiδi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M )NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))]
3. φ[ψ[(νi∈Iαiβiδi)(C | (νKMDK ′M ) NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))]]
 (νi∈Iαiβiδi)(C | (νKMDK
′
M )NAFS(F,∅, 0, ρ))
So by Proposition 7, R is secure.
Further we prove that the relation V in Figure 14 is also included in the simulation
preorder. By Proposition 10 we have:
Lemma 17. For any F , ρ, and C,
ψ[φ[(νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉,∅, 0, ⌈ρ⌉))]]
 (νi∈Iα
◦
i β
◦
i δ
◦
i )(⌈C⌉ | TFS(⌈F ⌉,∅, 0, ⌈ρ⌉))
So by Lemmas 16.1–2 and Corollary 8, R is safe and fully abstract.
7 Designing secure distributed protocols
In the preceding sections, we present a thorough analysis of the problem of distributing
access control. Let us now apply that analysis to a more general problem.
Suppose that we are required to design a distributed protocol that securely imple-
ments a specification. (The specification may be an arbitrary computation.) We can
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solve this problem by partitioning the specification into smaller computations, running
those computations in parallel, and securing the intermediate outputs of those compu-
tations so that they may be released and absorbed in any order. In particular, we can
design NSd+ by partitioning ISd+ into access control and storage, running them in
parallel, and securing the intermediate outputs of access control as capabilities. The
same principles should guide any such design. For instance, by (R3) and (R4) interme-
diate outputs should not leak information prematurely; by (R5) and (R6) such outputs
must be timestamped and the states on which they depend must not change between
clock ticks; and by (A5) the specification must be generalized with time bounds.
Computation as a graph We describe a computation as a directed graph G(V , E).
The input nodes, collected by Vi ⊆ V , are the nodes of indegree 0. The output nodes,
collected by Vo ⊆ V , are the nodes of outdegree 0. Further, we consider a set of state
nodes Vs ⊆ V such that Vi ∩ Vs = ∅. As a technicality, any node that is in a cycle or
has outdegree > 1 must be in Vs.
Nodes other than the input nodes run some code. Let M contain all terms and
⊏ be a strict total order on V . We label each v ∈ V \ (Vi ∪ Vs) with a function
λv : M
in(v) → M, and each v ∈ Vs with a function λv : Min(v) × M → M.
Further, each state node carries a shared clock, following the midnight-shift scheme.
A configuration (σ, τ) consists of a partial functionσ : V →M such that dom(σ) ⊇
Vs, and a total function τ : Vs → N. Intuitively, σ assigns values at the state nodes
and some other nodes, and τ assigns times at the state nodes. For any v ∈ V \ Vi, the
function λv outputs the value at v, taking as inputs the values at each incoming u, and
the value at v if v is a state node; further, if such u /∈ Vs, the value at u is “consumed”
on input. Formally, the operational semantics is given by a binary relation  over
configurations.
v ∈ V \ (Vi ∪ Vs) ∀k ∈ 1..in(v). (uk, v) ∈ E ∧ σ(uk) = tk
u1 ⊏ . . . ⊏ uin(v) σ
− = σ|Vs∪(V\{u1,...,uin(v)}
(σ, τ) (σ−[v 7→ λv(t1, . . . , tin(v))], τ)
v ∈ Vs τ(v) = Clk σ(v) = t
∀k ∈ 1..in(v). (uk, v) ∈ E ∧ σ(uk) = tk
u1 ⊏ . . . ⊏ uin(v) σ
− = σ|Vs∪(V\{u1,...,uin(v)}
(σ, τ) (σ−[v 7→ λv(t1, . . . , tin(v), t)], τ [v 7→ Clk+ 1])
As usual, we leave the context implicit; the adversary is an arbitrary context that can
write values at Vi, read values at Vo, and read times at Vs.
For example, a graph that describes ISd+ is:
•1 −→ ⋆2 −−→←− ⋆4 −→ •6 −→ ⋆7 −→ •8
↓ ↑
•3 •5
Here Vi = {•1, •5}, Vo = {•3, •8}, Vs = {⋆2, ⋆4, ⋆7}, and V = Vi ∪ Vo ∪ Vs ∪ {•6}.
Intuitively, ⋆2 carries accumulators, and •1 and •3 carry inputs and outputs for access
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modifications; ⋆4 carries access policies, and •6 carries access decisions; ⋆7 carries
stores, and •5 and •8 carry inputs and outputs for store operations. We define:
λ⋆2(〈k, θ〉, F, 〈 ,Ξ〉) = exec(permF,k,θ, θ,Ξ)
λ•3(〈N,Ξ〉) = N
λ⋆4(〈 ,Ξ〉, ) = Ξ
λ•6(F, 〈k, op〉) = 〈op, permF,k,op〉
λ⋆7(〈op, L〉, 〈 , ρ〉) = exec(L, op, ρ)
λ•8(〈N, ρ〉) = N
Distribution as a graph cut Once described as a graph, a computation can be dis-
tributed along any cut of that graph. For instance, ISd+ can be distributed along the
cut {(•6, ⋆7)} to obtain NSd+. We present this derivation formally in several steps.
Step 1 For each v ∈ V , let S(v) ⊆ Vs be the set of state nodes that have paths
to v, and I(v) ⊆ Vi be the set of input nodes that have paths to v without passing
through nodes in Vs. Then G(V , E) can be written in a form where, loosely, the values
at I(v) and the times at S(v) are explicit in σ(v) for each node v. Formally, the
explication of G is the graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) where Vˆ = V ∪ {vˆ | v ∈ Vi} ∪ {uˆ | u ∈ Vo} and
Eˆ = E ∪ {(vˆ, v) | v ∈ Vi} ∪ {(u, uˆ) | u ∈ Vo}. We define:
v ∈ Vi
λˆv(t) = 〈t, t〉
v ∈ Vo
λˆvˆ( , t) = t
v ∈ V \ (Vi ∪ Vs) λv(t1, . . . , tin(v)) = t
λˆv(〈I1, t1〉, . . . , 〈Iin(v), tin(v)〉) = 〈〈I1 . . . Iin(v)〉, t〉
v ∈ Vs σ(v) = 〈Clk, t〉 λv(t1, . . . , tin(v), t) = t
′
λˆv(〈 , t1〉, . . . , 〈 , tin(v)〉, 〈Clk, t〉) = 〈Clk + 1, t
′〉
This translation is sound and complete.
Theorem 18. Gˆ is fully abstract with respect to G.
For example, the explication of the graph for ISd+ is:
•1 −→ ⋆2 −−→←− ⋆4 −→ •6 −→ ⋆7 −→ •8
↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
•ˆ1 •3 •5 •ˆ8
↓ ↑
•ˆ3 •ˆ5
Here σ(•6) is of the form 〈〈k, op,Clk〉, 〈op, permF,k,op〉〉 rather than 〈op, permF,k,op〉;
the “input”σ(•ˆ5) = 〈k, op〉, the “time” τ(⋆4) = Clk, and the “output” 〈op, permF,k,op〉
of an access check are all explicit in σ(•6). A capability can be conveniently con-
structed from this form (see below).
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Step 2 Next, let E0 be any cut. As a technicality, we assume that E0 ∩ ((Vi ∪ Vs) ×
V) = ∅. The distribution of G along E0 is the graph G$(V$, E$), where V$ = Vˆ ∪
{v | (v, ) ∈ E0} ∪ {v
$ | (v, ) ∈ E0} and E$ = (Eˆ \ E0) ∪ {(v, v$) | (v, ) ∈ E0} ∪
{(v$, u) | (v, u) ∈ E0}. Let Kv and Ev be secret keys shared by v and v$ for every
(v, ) ∈ E0. We define:
(v, ) ∈ E0 λˆv(t1, . . . , tin(v)) = 〈t, t
′〉 m is fresh
λ$v(t1, . . . , tin(v)) = mac(〈t, {m, t
′}Ev〉,Kv)
(v, ) ∈ E0 τ(S(v)) is included in t
λ$
v$
(〈t,mac(〈t, { , t′}Ev〉,Kv)〉) = 〈t, t
′〉
v ∈ V \ Vi (v, ) /∈ E0
λ$v = λˆv
Intuitively, for every (v, ) ∈ E0, v$ carries the same values in G$ as v does in G;
those values are encoded and released at v, absorbed at v, and decoded back at v$. For
example, the distribution of the graph for ISd+ along the cut {(•6, ⋆7)} is:
•1 −→ ⋆2 −−→←− ⋆4 −→ •6 ⋆7 −→ •8
↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
•ˆ1 •3 •5 •
$
6 •ˆ8
↓ ↑ ↑
•ˆ3 •ˆ5 •6
This graph describes a variant of NSd+. In particular, the node •6 now carries a ca-
pability of the form mac(〈〈k, op,Clk〉, {m, 〈op, permF,k,op〉}E•6 〉,K•6), that secures
the input, time, and output of an access check.
Step 3 Finally, G is revised following (A5). The revision of G along E0 is the graph
G#(V#, E#), where V# = V ∪ {v# | (v, ) ∈ E0} and E# = E ∪ {(v#, v) | (v, ) ∈
E0}. We define:
(v, u) ∈ E0 τ(S(v)) ≤ T
λ#v (t1, . . . , tin(v), T ) = λv(t1, . . . , tin(v))
v ∈ V \ Vi (v, ) /∈ E0
λ#v = λv
Intuitively, for every (v, ) ∈ E0, progress at v requires that the times at S(v) do not
exceed the time bounds at v#. For example, the revised form of the graph for ISd+ is:
•1 −→ ⋆2 −−→←− ⋆4 −→ •6 −→ ⋆7 −→ •8
↓ ր ↑
•3 •
#
6 •5
Here •#6 carries a time bound T , and λ
#
•6(F, 〈k, op〉, T ) = λ•6(F, 〈k, op〉) if τ(⋆4) ≤
T .
We prove the following correctness result.
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Theorem 19. G$ is fully abstract with respect to G#.
By Theorem 19, the graph for NSd+ is fully abstract with respect to the revised graph
for ISd+.
Similarly, we can design NSs from IS s. The induced subgraph of ISd+ without
{•1, ⋆2, •3, ⋆4} describes IS s. We define λ•6(〈k, op〉) = 〈op, permF,k,op〉 for some
static F . Distributing along the cut {(•6, ⋆7)}, we obtain the induced subgraph of
NSd+ without {•ˆ1, •1, ⋆2, •3, •ˆ3, ⋆4}. This graph describes a variant of NSs, with
σ(•6) of the form mac(〈〈k, op〉, {m, 〈op, permF,k,op〉}E•6 〉,K•6). (Here capabilities
do not carry timestamps.) By Theorem 19, the graph for NSs is fully abstract with
respect to a trivially revised graph for IS s, where λ#•6(〈k, op〉, 〈〉) = λ•6(〈k, op〉).
8 Conclusion
We present a comprehensive analysis of the problem of implementing distributed ac-
cess control with capabilities. In previous work, we show how to implement static
access policies securely [10] and dynamic access policies safely [11]. In this paper,
we explain those results in new light, revealing the several pitfalls that any such de-
sign must care about for correctness, while discovering interesting special cases that
allow simpler implementations. Further, we present new insights on the difficulty of
implementing dynamic access policies securely (a problem that has hitherto remained
unsolved). We show that such an implementation is in fact possible if the specification
is slightly generalized.
Moreover, our analysis turns out to be surprisingly general. Guided by the same
basic principles, we show how to automatically derive secure distributed implementa-
tions of other stateful computations. This approach is reminiscent of secure program
partitioning [22], and investigating its scope should be interesting future work.
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